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African swine fever (ASF) is currently spreading westwards throughout Europe and
eastwards into China, with cases occurring in both wild boar and domestic pigs. A
generic risk assessment framework is used to determine the probability of first infection
with ASF virus (ASFV) at a fine spatial scale across European Union Member States.
The framework aims to assist risk managers across Europe with their ASF surveillance
and intervention activities. Performing the risk assessment at a fine spatial scale allows
for hot-spot surveillance, which can aid risk managers by directing surveillance or
intervention resources at those areas or pathways deemed most at risk, and hence
enables prioritization of limited resources. We use 2018 cases of ASF to estimate
prevalence of the disease in both wild boar and pig populations and compute the risk of
initial infection for 2019 at a 100 km2 cell resolution via three potential pathways: legal
trade in live pigs, natural movement of wild boar, and legal trade in pig meat products.
We consider the number of pigs, boar and amount of pig meat entering our area of
interest, the prevalence of the disease in the origin country, the probability of exposure
of susceptible pigs or boar in the area of interest to introduced infected pigs, boar, or
meat from an infected pig, and the probability of transmission to susceptible animals. We
provide maps across Europe indicating regions at highest risk of initial infection. Results
indicate that the risk of ASF in 2019 was predominantly focused on those regions which
already had numerous cases in 2018 (Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, and Latvia).
The riskiest pathway for ASFV transmission to pigs was the movement of wild boar for
Eastern European countries and legal trade of pigs for Western European countries. New
infections are more likely to occur in wild boar rather than pigs, for both the pig meat and
wild boar movement pathways. Our results provide an opportunity to focus surveillance
activities and thus increase our ability to detect ASF introductions earlier, a necessary
requirement if we are to successfully control the spread of this devastating disease for
the pig industry.
Keywords: risk assessment, disease transmission, pork product, swine disease, wild boars, European Union (EU),
disease hotspot, riskiest pathway
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INTRODUCTION
African Swine Fever (ASF) is an infectious disease of several
members of the suidae family that is caused by African swine
fever virus (ASFV) belonging to the Asfarviridae family (1).
Animals can become infected with ASFV via nasal, oral,
subcutaneous, or ocular penetration, and once infected they will
shed the virus into the environment (2), and even after death
their carcasses can continue to contribute to virus dissemination
since the virus can persist in blood and tissues for prolonged
periods. It has been demonstrated that the virus can remain viable
in feces and urine up to 8 and 15 days, respectively, (3) and for
weeks in pork meat and processed products (4–8). There is also
the possibility that ASFV can spread via soft ticks, which is the
predominant method of spread between warthogs, bush pigs, and
wild pigs in the disease origin area in sub-Sahara Africa, although
they are not a requirement for disease spread (1). Thus, ASFV
has a high capacity for transmission by both direct and indirect
contact with infected animals, or via the environment, vectors,
and animal products.
ASF is recognized as one of the most important and dreaded
diseases of pigs for several reasons. Firstly, it can spread to pigs
in disease-naïve areas through numerous different entry routes
such as trade in live animals and animal products, wild animal
migrations, fomites, vehicles, and vector movements (9, 10).
This makes it particularly challenging to implement effective
preventive measures in order to minimize the risk of incursion of
the disease. Secondly, until now, no vaccine has been available for
ASF (10). Thirdly, if introduction of ASF does occur in a region,
the disease can have a devastating impact on the swine sector as
it can result in huge losses (10). Some viral strains demonstrate
a high virulence potential and can effect a lethality rate near
100% (11). Once the introduction of the disease in a region is
confirmed, culling of sick animals and restrictions for live animal
and animal product trade follow in order to limit the spread of the
disease to neighboring areas or other countries; these mitigation
measures lead to further economic damage for farmers and food
producers. Finally, management and eradication of the disease in
areas with new incursions or endemic areas is difficult, resource-
intensive, and costly due to the infectivity durability of the virus
in the environment, the many transmission pathways and the
potential establishment of a wild animal reservoir population,
which could be supported by competent vectors (if present)
(1). Therefore, effective methods to help decision makers decide
where to focus limited surveillance resources are very useful and
can help to reduce the economic impact of an ASF outbreak.
The epidemiological situation of ASF has changed rapidly over
the last few decades. Historically, the disease was mainly present
in the African swine population but, after entering Portugal in
1957 likely due to swill feeding with contaminated food waste,
it became endemic in the Iberian peninsula and several linked
outbreaks were observed in Italy, France, Malta, Belgium, and
the Netherlands during the following years (12). Apart from
Sardinia, where the disease continues to persist until now, ASF
was considered completely eradicated from Europe in 1995.
However, in 2007, outbreaks were reported in domestic and
wild boars in Georgia, the first time outside of sub-Saharan
Africa in many years (1). The virus introduction was probably
caused by the import of contaminated meat from Madagascar
or Mozambique (12). Despite the effort to contain and eradicate
the disease, ASF spread progressively to other countries in the
Caucasian region such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Russian
Federation in 2007–2008 (12, 13). Migration of infected wild
boars, trade of infected animals and derived meat products, poor
biosecurity measures and delayed notification by small farmers
seem to be the most important factors that hampered the disease
eradication and lead to a constant spread toward the European
Union (EU) during the following years (14, 15). New outbreaks
concerning domesticated and wild pigs were reported in Ukraine
(2012), Belarus (2013), Poland and Baltic countries (2014) (16).
EUMember States (MS) responded to this rapid escalation of the
disease situation by intensifying biosafety mitigation measures
and setting up specific surveillance programmes and information
campaigns for veterinarians, farmers, and travelers (9). However,
until now (May 2019), ASF is still present in the mentioned
countries and outbreaks in pigs or wild boars have also been
notified by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania
(12, 16). Several ASFV infected wild boars were also found in
Belgium confirming that ASF is able to make large geographic
jumps (15). In addition, since 2017 the disease began to progress
rapidly in an easterly direction, with the Russian Federation
registering new cases in East Siberia followed by China in 2018
and Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia in 2019 (17).
Direct contact between sick and healthy animals is one of
the most evident ways of virus transmission considering that
saliva, urine and feces are heavily contaminated (18). Although
animal health legislation of all European countries bans live
animal trade from high-risk areas, the absence of clinical signs
during the latent period makes the early identification (and
notification) of new outbreaks in ASF-free regions difficult as
well as the detection of infected pigs by the border authorities
of the destination country. As such, there can be a fairly large
time window at the start of an ASF outbreak in a region where
no one is aware the disease is circulating in the pig population
and thus infected pigs may be traded. Another prominent cause
of incursion of ASFV in European ASF-free areas is by import of
pork products derived from infected animals (2). If the disease
is not detected by Local Authorities at farm or abattoir level,
infected pigs can be slaughtered and their contaminated carcasses
used for fresh or processed pork products. Swill feeding is illegal
inmost countries around the world, including the EU, but despite
this, some pigs raised in backyard or free-ranging small farms
are fed with untreated food leftovers or catering waste (18). The
prolonged survival of the virus in edible tissues and the low
infectious dose required to infect animals make this transmission
pathway particularly relevant, as proven by several outbreaks
in recent years (19). Even if waste pork products are properly
disposed of, wild boar are still potentially able to get access to
landfills or waste bins, become infected after contacting/ingesting
the contaminated food, and transmit the virus to the local animal
population. Wild boar can play an important epidemiological
role not only in this transmission pathway but they can also
be responsible for transboundary spread of the disease due to
their natural dispersal ecology in search of new territory (20).
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Indeed, although wild boars normally remain close to their natal
home range, studies reported that they are capable of covering
long distances (up to 250 km) (21). A new outbreak can occur
when infected wild boar are able to gain access to farms and
contact susceptible domestic pigs, such as those on farms with
poor biosecurity measures. As an example, the initial infection of
the Lithuanian pig population with ASF is believed to be due to
movements of infected wild boars from Belarus (19, 22).
Due to the importance of ASF and the recent incursion
into Europe, several risk assessments have been performed in
order to estimate the likelihood of introduction of ASF into
Europe or specific European countries, using qualitative, semi-
quantitative and quantitative models. In 2010, the European
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) evaluated the risk of endemicity
of ASF in the Caucasus region and the consequent risk of
release into Europe through several potential routes (13). A
few years later, the same qualitative model, which was based
on expert elicitation, was used to update the results given new
epidemiological and experimental evidence (23). Recently, two
similar semi-quantitative methodologies, which rely on expert
knowledge, were developed to assess the ASF risk, via multiple
pathways, to Belgium (24) and Finland (25). Furthermore, semi-
quantitative frameworks, which score the risk of ASFV release
in the EU, have been published for a single route of disease
entry such as wild boar movements (26, 27), illegal importation
of pork and pork products (28) and transport-associated routes
(29). Regarding the quantitative riskmodels, only a few have been
developed until now. Mur et al. (30) estimated the probability
of ASFV entry for each country of the EU through the import
of live pigs and, a few years later, the same group presented a
risk assessment considering multiple ASFV entry pathways of
high relevance for transmission, although some of them were still
modeled adopting a semi-quantitative approach (31). Recently,
Lange et al. (32) developed a mechanistic model to simulate the
spread of the disease in wild boar populations in Europe and
subsequently to assess the impact of control measures, presence
of natural, or artificial barriers andmanagement strategies of wild
animal populations implemented by affected EU MSs. Lastly,
Simons et al. (33) assessed the risk of entry of ASF into EU
MSs using a quantitative model for a number of pathways,
although did not consider whether this could lead to infection
in susceptible pigs or wild boar in those countries.
Apart from Lange et al. (32), all of the models listed above,
whether qualitative or quantitative, assessed the risk for a single
or multiple EU countries at a country level. Furthermore, some
of the models assessed the risk of entry only and did not consider
the transmission to susceptible pig or wild boar populations.
Only one of the models (33) was able to quantitatively assess
the incursion risk by multiple pathways, however, due to only
assessing risk of entry, it was not possible to compare pathways
in that model to indicate which pathway was of greatest risk. In
this study, we adapt a generic risk assessment framework (34) to
assess quantitatively the risk of infection with ASFV in domestic
pigs or wild boar across Europe at a fine spatial scale (100 km2
cells) via multiple pathways, namely trade in live pigs, trade in
pig meat products, and movement of wild boar. We create risk
maps for 2019 of the probability of infection in pigs and boar for
each pathway and for all pathways combined, in order to identify
hotspots of ASFV incursions in the EU, and the pathways of most
importance in each area.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We assess the probability of at least one infection in boar or pigs
through three pathways of transmission within Europe, namely:
legal trade of pigs, legal trade of pig meat, and movement of wild
boar. We acknowledge that other pathways may be important for
transmission of ASFV, such as legal movement of meat within
the EU via travelers, but could not find data of sufficient detail
or quality to parametrize these with enough certainty (2, 9). The
wild boar pathway is assessed for the whole of Europe, whereas
the other two pathways are restricted to EUMSs only due to lack
of data in other European countries. The approach is stochastic
and applies the framework outlined in Taylor et al. (34). The risk
assessment framework is outlined in brief below and we highlight
how it is followed for each of the pathways. The risk of ASF is
assessed through these three pathways separately and combined
into one overall risk at a spatial scale of 100 km2 raster cells. The
risk assessment uses reported cases in 2018 in order to predict the
risk of ASF infection in 2019.
The Generic Risk Assessment Framework
The generic framework for performing quantitative spatial
assessments of risk of infection is designed to be suitable formany
disease entry pathways (Figure 1), with the aim of answering the
risk question “What is the risk of infection of a pathogen in Area
B due to the presence of that pathogen in Area A?”
Adopting this framework, we calculate the risk of initial
infection with ASFV via a single pathway by estimating how
many infectious animals/products (depending on the entry
pathway) will enter a new Area B given the disease is present
in Area A, whether detection of those animals/products would
occur, the probability of survival of the animal and pathogen,
and the rate of contact and transmission to susceptible animals
in Area B. In this risk assessment for ASF, Area B is defined to
be EU MSs and Area A is the whole world. We compute the risk
assessment at a 100 km2 cell level in Europe by first calculating
the number of infected units entering cell c of Area B, Ik (c), as:
Ik (c) ∼ Bin
(
Nk (c) , pk
)
, (1)
where k is a region of Area A (defined for each pathway),Nk (c) is
the number of units (pigs/boar/pig meat) moving from region k
to cell c and pk is the prevalence in the relevant species in region
k. We thus define I(c) =
∑
k Ik(c) as the total number of infected
units entering cell c from all of Area A. For the trade pathways,
we define the regions of Area A to be countries around the world.
For the wild boar movement pathway, we define the regions of
Area A to be 100 km2 cells in which we estimate prevalence to be
non-zero, based on reported cases in Europe.
For the detection step, in this ASF case study, we assume
there is no detection of infected animals or products in the trade
or movement pathways. The only relevant EU decree regarding
movement of pigs or pigmeat involves a restriction on trade from
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FIGURE 1 | The generic framework for calculating risk of infection spatially, as seen in Taylor et al. (34). There are five steps in the framework: Entry, Detection,
Survival, Contact, and Transmission to address the risk question “What is the risk of infection of a pathogen in Area B due to the presence of that pathogen in Area
A?” The term “unit” in Step 1 addresses the fact that it could be infected animals or products or contaminated items entering.
ASFV infection zones once cases are detected, and we account
for this in the prevalence estimates. Otherwise, any testing of
pigs or pig meat is voluntary and the exact procedures may
vary widely by country. We therefore assume no inspection or
testing of traded pigs and pig meat occurs, and treat this as a
worst-case scenario. However, we do perform a scenario analysis
with detection included, with method and results provided in
the Supplementary Info S3.
We use the disease metric R0 to describe the survival of the
pathogen/animal, as well as contact and transmission between
the infectious units and susceptible pigs and wild boar. R0
is a measure of the expected number of new infections that
would occur if one infectious unit were to enter a susceptible
population. Our equation for R0(c) includes information on the
susceptible populations at risk in cell c, the pathway of entry, the
transmission between infected and susceptible animals and the
duration of infection. Each parameter from R0(c) is drawn from
a distribution of likely values. The number of initial infections,
NI(c), in cell c is then calculated by I(c) draws from a Poisson
distribution with mean given by R0 (c):
NI (c) =
I(c)∑
1
ξ
ξ ∼ Pois (R0 (c)) .
Each infected animal entering cell c will in turn infect an
average of R0 (c) susceptible animals. We represent this by
a Poisson distribution with mean R0 (c), as this distribution
simulates the number of events that can occur given the expected
number, and ensures a non-negative integer value is returned.
There are I(c) infected units entering cell c, each with the
same Poisson distribution, which produces the summation, to
give NI(c) new infections overall. The probability RI,X,p(c) or
RI,X,b(c) that at least one susceptible animal would become
infected in cell c due to entry via a single pathway X is then
given by the proportion of the simulations where infection
occurs in a susceptible pig or boar, respectively. We outline
in greater detail below how we compute each step of the
risk assessment for each of the pathways below. Within the
model, we use the Poisson distribution, as outlined above, or
the Binomial distribution to simulate the expected number of
successful events that occur if each event has the same probability
of success.
Legal Trade of Live Pigs
The legal trade of live pigs is the easiest to implement under
the framework outlined above as there is good data availability
for parameters for each step in the pathway. For the entry of
infectious animals, we use trade data from TRACES (35) to
determine the total number of animals (Nk (c)) moving from
each region k of Area A to each cell c of Area B and input
this into Equation (1). The TRACES data includes a post-code
for the destination of the trade, the country of origin and total
number of animals moving in 1 year from that country to that
post-code destination. We convert the destination post-codes to
latitude and longitude values to find the 100 km2 cell of entry.
We calculate prevalence at a country level to coincide with the
TRACES data on origin of trade. For prevalence data in each
country of the world, we use output from the model outlined in
Simons et al. (36), which uses OIE data on recent reported cases
of ASF (excluding cases in Sardinia due to successful containment
on the island) to calculate prevalence in each country of the
world. This model for prevalence incorporates under-reporting,
trade restrictions within infected zones and the length of latent
period of the disease to compute an accurate prevalence estimate.
We assume that all animals are destined for farms. Therefore,
we assess the survival, contact and transmission rates assuming
contact with susceptible pigs on a farm. To calculate the survival,
contact and transmission between imported pigs and susceptible
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pigs on a farm, we use the following equation for R0:
R0 =
γβS(c)
r
.
In this equation, γ is the contact rate between pigs, β is the
probability of transmission given contact between pigs, S(c) is the
number of susceptible pigs that the animal could have contact
with and r is the rate of an infected pig dying from or recovering
and no longer shedding ASFV. We assume no contact with wild
boar in this pathway. For further details of how this pathway
is computed, see Supplementary Info S1 and Taylor et al. (34)
in which a case study for the live animal trade pathway was
performed for Lumpy skin disease.
Movement of Wild Boar
As there are no datasets on wild boar movement between
countries, never mind between 100 km2 cells, we instead use
a model of boar movement at the cell level. This is based on
boar ecology, such as which age groups and gender tend to
undergo dispersal events compared to home range movement
and the reason for movement. The model for movement of boar
is adapted from Simons et al. (33) and is explained fully in Taylor
et al. (37); we outline the key steps here. The model uses data
on boar abundance and the habitat suitability of Europe at a cell
level for boar (38). We include two types of boar movement—
within a home range and long-range dispersal. When performing
home range movement, the boar traverses the whole of its home
range area. For long-range dispersal, we fix a total number of
steps that each dispersing boar will perform, based on maximum
distances of boar dispersal and our cell size. In order to determine
the direction of boar movement from each cell we use the habitat
suitability score for each cell as a proxy for deciding where boar
would want to move to. We calculate the ratio between the
habitat suitability in each neighboring cell and the overall habitat
suitability of all the neighboring cells and use that to determine
the probability of the boar moving to each cell. We assume
one dispersal event each year and assume that a dispersing boar
spends the rest of the year performing home-range movement.
We calculate Nk (c), the number of boar moving from all cells
(k) in Area A which have non-zero prevalence to cells (c) in Area
B, by combining the probability of moving to each cell and the
total number of boar in the origin cell, using an abundance map
of boar across Europe (38). Then to determine howmany infected
boar enter each cell c in Area B using Equation (1), we estimate
prevalence in wild boar for each origin region k, which in this case
are also 100 km2 cells, using the locations of reported ASFV cases
in wild boar, an under-reporting factor to account for infected
boar carcasses not being found or reported, and the abundance
of boar in each cell.
We calculate the potential transmission of ASFV from these
infected boar to susceptible boar and pigs in the destination cell
using two separate equations for R0 for transmission to boar
and pigs. For wild boar contact with pigs, we use a similar
formula to the R0 for live pig trade, in which we include the
number of susceptible pigs in the area at risk, the length of
the infectious period in live boar, the contact rate between boar
and pigs and the probability of transmission given contact. We
adapt the equation for R0 for boar by including two additional
factors—group dynamics and contact with carcasses. As wild
boar primarily live in matrilineal groups (39), we use different
contact rates for within and between group contact. ASFV is both
highly virulent with almost 100%mortality and highly persistent,
such that carcasses can remain contaminated for a long time.
Thus, we include the possibility that a susceptible boar could
become infected from an infected boar carcass, by considering
data on contact rates between live boar and boar carcasses, the
probability of transmission via such contact and the length of
time the boar carcass is available for contact. The equations for R0
are included in Supplementary Info S1 and further explanation
is provided in Taylor et al. (37).
Legal Trade of Pig Meat Products
There are datasets available on the amount of legally traded
pig meat products, such as from Comext (40) which gives
information on the amount (in tons) of pig meat products that
are imported into each EU MS from both within and outside of
the EU. Similar to the legal trade of pigs pathway, we use output
from the model reported in Simons et al. (36) to estimate the
prevalence of ASFV in pig meat products at time of slaughter
in each country of the world. When calculating the entry of pig
meat products from infected pigs, we use the same Binomial
formula as outlined above but now use volume of product instead
of number of animals—our unit in Figure 1 is now grams of
pig meat products. We also have to take into account the many
different product types that fall under the category of pig meat.
The Comext data are split into different product types by a
product code, representing the different products that are traded
and the different processes each of the productsmay undergo.We
simplify this data into 12 categories for product type, based on
similarities of product composition, and five processes that the
product may undergo, which leads to 21 product types overall
(since not all product types will undergo all types of processes).
See Supplementary Info S1 for a final list of all product types and
processes. We keep these separate at this stage and estimate the
amount of product from infected pigs for each of the 21 product
types entering each EUMS.
As the legal trade in pig meat products is primarily for
human consumption, this pathway focuses on estimating the
probability that this meat for human consumption could end
up inadvertently being contacted or consumed by domestic pigs
or wild boar. We assume that wild boar can be in contact with
food waste through landfill and other locations (e.g., waste bins
outside households or in parks, nature reserves etc.) which may
contain pig meat waste products. For domestic pigs we assume
that biosecurity levels on commercial farms across Europe are
high and so the probability of potential contact with imported
pig meat is negligible and therefore it was decided it was not
necessary to consider this further. However, for backyard pig
farms we consider the possibility of contact due to illegal swill
feeding. Due to the need to consider how pig meat products
could end up in waste or being swill-fed to a backyard pig,
there are a few additional considerations in the contact, survival,
and transmission steps of the pathway. We include a more
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 5 January 2020 | Volume 6 | Article 486
Taylor et al. Risk of ASF in Europe
detailed version of the generic risk pathway for the food pathway
(Figure 2) and describe these additional steps below.
Entry
The Binomial Equation (1) is used to compute the entry of
product from infected animals by combining the total amount
in grams of each product traded from the country of origin to the
destination country and the prevalence in the country of origin.
Similar to the live pig trade pathway, the prevalence at a country
level is estimated using the method outlined in Simons et al. (33).
We assume each gram of pig meat product from each country
has the same probability of being derived from an infected pig.
As above, we sum over all source regions to produce the total
amount of infected product in grams entering each destination
country C, for each product type z, which we denote by I(C, z).
Viral Load
For ease of computation regarding contact, survival and
transmission, we switch at this point to perform our
computations using the total viral load entering each country
rather than the amount of infected product. We calculate
v(TS, C, z), the initial viral load in product z for all grams of
product z destined for country C at time of slaughter (TS). The
viral load at time TS will be higher than the viral load at time
of entry to country C, but we include this decay over time in
the survival step instead. As we do not include detection on
entry, the amount of infected product on entry is the same at
time of slaughter and time of entry. The initial viral load at
time TS is based upon the average composition of each product
type from different animal tissues (namely meat, fat, offal,
skin, and bone) and the viral load concentration in infected
tissues. See Supplementary Info S1 for the proportions for
each product type z split into the component tissues. We use
estimates of an average viral load concentration in each tissue,
from experimental data, assuming that the pig was slaughtered
before clinical signs appeared (it was assumed that any pig
showing clinical signs would be immediately removed from the
food chain) and the virus concentration follows an exponential
relationship from the day of infection until the viremia peak and
decreases similarly until the day the virus is not detectable. Thus,
the initial viral load is calculated as
v (TS, C, z) =
∑
zp
pzp I(C, z)10
vI (zp),
where zp represents the different tissues in product z, pzp is the
proportion of product z that is composed of tissue zp and vI(zp)
is the initial viral load concentration in tissue zp.
Survival
We consider three steps when estimating the survival of the
virus in each product type: the survival of virus during animal
slaughter and meat processing, during transport time and during
cooking. Processing occurs in the origin country, transport
is between countries, and the cooking process for any raw
meat imported occurs in the destination country C. Thus, this
survival step estimates how the viral load will change from time
of slaughter, TS, to the time of consumption of the product,
irrespective of whether this product will end up being in contact
with pigs or boar.
Different processes that may be applied to pig meat products
include salting, drying, smoking, and being chilled or frozen. For
virus survival during processing, we determine the remaining
viral load in each product matrix after processing by assuming
an exponential decay of viral load, using data on the decay rate in
each tissue, the process that is undergone for that product type
and the length of time that process will take. The viral decay
rate, rv(z) depends on the product type z, as it is calculated
based upon the maximum virus survival time in products that
have undergone different processes. For estimating the decay
due to processes, we did not include the fact that the processes
themselves may reduce the viral load further, we only included
the time taken for a process to occur. For some products,
it is possible that multiple processes are applied, however,
these processes may or may not be undergone simultaneously.
Therefore, for these, we assume the process that takes the least
amount of time as this is a worst-case assumption for amount
of remaining viral load. Therefore, the viral load after time
of processing (Tp) of product type z destined for country C,
v(Tp, C, z), is
v
(
Tp, C, z
)
= v (TS, C, z) (1− rv (z))
tp ,
where tp is the assumed time taken to undergo the process.
To estimate the viral load after transport (TT), we estimated
the average time taken for transport between different countries.
This was based on the distance between the country of origin of
the trade and the destination country, the speed of two transport
methods—fast (e.g., flight) or slow (e.g., ship/rail/lorry) transport
between the countries, and the proportion of trade that would
occur via fast or slow transport. For further details of how the
average time, tT(C), for transport to country C was estimated, see
Supplementary Info S1. Therefore, the viral load after transport
v(TT , C, z), is calculated as:
v (TT , C, z) = v
(
Tp, C, z
)
(1− rv (z))
tT (C) .
Lastly, we included virus survival during cooking in the
destination country C. We assumed that products which had
been salted, smoked, or dried would not undergo a cooking
process but all other product types would. ASF virus is killed
if food is cooked to 60◦C for at least 10min (41), and hence
to determine the viral load remaining after cooking (TC), we
apply the Binomial equation to the viral load after transport (for
relevant products z) and the probability that the food is not
cooked to at least 60◦C, pC < 60.
v (TC, C, z) ∼ Bin(v (TT , C, z) , pC<60).
Therefore, v (TC, C, z) is the final viral load in product z at time
of consumption, based upon the decay of viral load from time
of slaughter due to processing, transport time, and cooking. The
total viral load in country C at time of consumption is then
calculated by summing over all product types:
v (C) =
∑
z
v (TC, C, z).
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FIGURE 2 | Risk pathway for the risk of ASFV infection in pigs and wild boar via the legal trade of meat products pathway. Probabilities or inputs considered for each
step are outlined in green ovals, and the outputs along the pathway as rectangles. On the left, the boxes indicate how this framework fits within the more generic
framework in Figure 1. The dashed lines indicate that the converse to the statement can also lead to meat products at a rubbish disposal.
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Contact
There are multiple steps to consider when asking how meat from
an infected animal entering each EU MS would potentially have
contact with susceptible pigs or wild boar. The Comext dataset
on trade only indicates the destination country of the trade and
does not give any finer spatial resolution. As the pig meat is
intended for human consumption, we distribute the infected
pig meat around the country based on human density in each
EU MS at a 100 km2 cell level. Therefore, if in one cell in a
country there lives 1% of the population of that country, then
1% of the infected pig meat entering the country will go to
that cell. Therefore, the viral load entering each cell c, v(c), in
country C is
v (c) = v (C)
h (c)
h (C)
,
where h(c) is the abundance of humans in cell
c and h(C) is the abundance of humans in
country C.
We assume that pig meat will have one of two destinations—a
non-household setting (e.g., in restaurants or by food producers;
hereafter referred to as restaurants) or a household. A small
proportion of food is lost along the food chain, for example
during distribution, prior to reaching a restaurant or household
(pL<{H,R}), and then we split the total amount of infected meat by
whether it will go to a restaurant (R) or a household (H). As pigs
and boar are unintended recipients of the pig meat, we estimate
how much meat they could be in contact with by estimating how
much of the pig meat is wasted. Therefore, the total viral load in
each cell that is wasted at a restaurant is estimated as
vR(c) = pW(R)pR(1− pL<{H,R})v (c) ,
where pR is the proportion of pig meat that goes to a restaurant
and pW(R) is the proportion of food wasted at a restaurant.
We perform a similar calculation for the amount of viral load
remaining if food goes to a household. As each backyard farm
will be connected to a single household, we estimate the amount
of viral load at a household, vH(c), that is subsequently wasted, as
vH(c) = pW(H)
pH(1− pL<{H,R})v(c)
H(c)
,
where pH is the proportion of food that goes to a household,H(c)
is the number of households in cell c and pW(H) is the proportion
of food wasted at a household. We estimate the number of
households in each cell c, H(c), using a Poisson distribution:
H (c) ∼ Pois(SH(c)),
where SH(c) is the expected number of households in cell
c, determined by the number of people in cell c, h(c),
divided by the average number of people per household in
that country.
We now need to consider whether a backyard pig or boar
could actually be in contact with this viral load. First we
consider the situation for domestic pigs, by considering the viral
load per household, vH (c), and the likelihood that a backyard
pig would be in contact with it. To do this, we estimate the
number of backyard pig farms (NBF(c)) in each cell c, using a
Poisson distribution,
NBF (c) ∼ Pois
(
SNBF (c)
)
.
SNBF (c) is the expected number of backyard farms in cell c, which
we outline how to compute in the Supplementary Info S1. The
number of these backyard pig farms that swill feed their pigs is
then estimated as
NSF (c) ∼ Bin
(
NBF (c) , pSF
)
,
where pSF is the probability that a household with a backyard pig
farm would illegally swill-feed their swine. This probability (see
Supplementary Info S1) is not country-specific as sufficient data
to be able to refine the parameter to country level are missing.
NP(c) is the total number of backyard pigs in cell c which would
swill feed, calculated as
NP (c) =
NSF(c)∑
1
Pois(SNPF (C)),
where SNPF (C) is the average number of pigs on a backyard farm
which differs by country C.
Therefore, if a pig is swill fed, which is determined by the
number of swill-feeding backyard farms NSF (c) and the number
of pigs on those farms, NP (c), the amount of viral load that a
single pig would have contact with is
vP (c) = vH(c)
NSF (c)
NP(C)
.
For wild boar contact with wasted pig meat products, there are
two potential sources of wasted products that could end up in
landfill or other sources of refuse—from a household that does
not swill feed (whether it has a backyard pig farm or not) and
from restaurants. We use the term landfill to denote any refuse
site, including waste bins at household or in public locations.
We define vL(c) as the viral load going to a landfill in cell c and
compute it as
vL(c) = TW(pL(R)vR(c)+ pL(H)(H(c)− NSF(c))vH(c)).
As vH(c) is the amount of viral load in product at a single
household, we multiply it in the equation above byH(c)−NSF(c),
the number of households in cell c that do not swill feed, to
recreate the total amount wasted in cell c from those households.
We also consider the proportion of waste that will be disposed
of in a landfill or other rubbish disposal that wild boar can
have contact with (compared to e.g., waste that goes toward
biofuels), with separate proportions for restaurant waste pL (R)
and household waste, pL(H). We also reduce the amount of viral
load in a landfill site by the duration of time that the waste will
be available for boar, TW , (as landfills are added to regularly,
older waste will be difficult to access due to newer waste being
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 8 January 2020 | Volume 6 | Article 486
Taylor et al. Risk of ASF in Europe
placed on top; for other refuse sites, the waste will be taken
away frequently). Due to lack of data on landfill locations, we
assume that all waste is disposed of in the same cell as the waste
was produced.
We now need to consider the likelihood that wild boar could
have contact with this viral load at a landfill to estimate the
amount of viral load each wild boar could be in contact with. To
estimate this, we consider two probabilities—boar approaching
and trying to contact landfill sites, pCW and boar being able to
gain access to the landfill sites, pAW . The number of boar trying
to contact the waste site, NBW (c), is given by
NBW (c) ∼ Bin
(
NTB (c) , pCW
)
,
whereNTB (c) is the total number of boar in cell c. The probability
that contact will be successful depends on the access to the site,
which is given by a Bernoulli distribution, leading to
NB (c) = NBW (c)Bern
(
pAW
)
as the number of boar accessing the site, NB (c), and eating food
waste at a landfill. The accessibility to the waste will clearly be
different depending on whether it is a landfill or a public bin near
a forest, but we assume an average parameter across all types of
refuse sites.
Lastly, we need to calculate the amount of viral load that
a single wild boar could be in contact with in cell c, vB(c).
We do this based on the approximation that an average
boar will eat a household’s weekly amount of waste (see
Supplementary Info S1) and distribute the infected meat equally
among households. This leads to
vB(c) =
vL(c)
H(c)
.
Transmission
For the viral transmission to pigs or wild boar, given contact with
the contaminated meat, we assume an exponential dose-response
relationship as this is both a common assumption in microbial
risk assessment (42) and has been used to assess response to
ASFV exposure (43). Given the viral load that a pig or boar
could contact or ingest, we assume that a pig or boar will become
infected given by the formula
Ip (c) = 1− e
−rvP(c)
shown here using the pig viral load, vP(c) as illustration, where r
is the dose-response parameter from experimental studies.
Risk of Infection via Pig Meat Products
The equation above assesses if a single pig or boar will become
infected due to the consumption of expected viral load that a
pig or boar could be in contact with. We now combine this
with the number of backyard pigs or boar at risk to calculate
the probability of at least one infection in boar or pigs per year.
Similar to the equation for NI(c) in the generic framework, we
calculate NI,P(c), the number of infections in backyard pigs in
each cell c, and NI,B(c), the number of infections in boar in each
cell c, as
NI,P (c) = Bin
(
NP (c) , Ip (c)
)
,
NI,B (c) = Bin (NB (c) , IB (c)) .
As indicated in the generic risk framework, the probability of at
least one infection in boar, RI,F,b (c), or pigs, RI,F,p (c), in cell c
via this pathway is estimated by the proportion of simulations in
which NI,B (c) > 0 or NI,P (c) > 0, respectively.
Overall Risk of Infection
The methods outlined above detail how the probability of at
least one infection in boar or pigs is estimated per pathway. We
combine these results, which are independently calculated, to
produce the probability of at least one infection in boar or pigs in
cell c via any of the three pathways considered.We define RI,P,s(c)
as the probability of at least one infection in cell c via the trade in
live pigs pathway in species s (either pigs or boar), RI,M,s(c) as the
probability of at least one infection in cell c via the movement
of wild boar pathway in species s, RI,F,s(c) as the probability of
at least one infection in cell c via the trade in pig meat pathway
in species s, and lastly RI,T,s(c) as the probability of at least one
infection in cell c via any of the three pathways in species s. Then
we calculate RI,T,s(c) as.
RI,T,s(c) = 1−
(
1− RI,P,s(c)
) (
1− RI,M,s(c)
) (
1− RI,F,s(c)
)
.
Data
We include details of datasets used in the three pathways in
Table 1. This accounts for the data that differed by country or
by cell, whereas data that was represented by a single number or
a distribution, primarily disease-related parameters, are provided
in the Supplementary Info S1.
Sensitivity Analysis
We perform a sensitivity analysis of key parameters with the
most uncertainty in the food pathway. In particular we analyze
the effect of uncertainty on the following parameters: probability
that food is cooked sufficiently to kill the virus (pC<60), the
proportion of food that is wasted in a household or restaurant
(pW(H), pW(R)), the probability of illegal swill-feeding (pSF),
the accessibility of landfills for boar (pAW) and the duration of
waste availability (TW). We measure the sensitivity of the food
pathway to these parameters by focusing on those cells which are
hotspots of disease risk, which we define to be any cell which has a
probability of infection in boar of 0.02 or higher, or a probability
of infection in pigs of 0.0001 or higher. For full details of the
sensitivity analysis, see Supplementary Info S3.
RESULTS
The risk of infection with ASFV for pigs and wild boar is
calculated for all EU MSs at a 100 km2 level for each pathway
and also combined to produce an overall risk for each species.
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TABLE 1 | The datasets used for three pathways, with a detailed description of the data used, the date the data is from and a reference for the data source.
Model input Data used Date range References
Number of legal live pigs traded TRACES data which states origin country, post-code
location of end location, and number of pigs traded in a year.
2017 (35)
Prevalence of ASF in pigs Country-level results from Simons et al. (33) which estimates
prevalence using reported cases of the disease (from the
OIE), under-reporting, the likelihood of an outbreak, the
latent period of disease and stopping trade after disease is
detected
Reported cases up to and
including all of 2018
(33, 36, 44)
Prevalence of ASF in wild boar Estimated prevalence at a 100 km2 cell level using reported
cases of the disease and an under-reporting factor.
All wild boar cases in 2018 (44)
Wild boar abundance A map of wild boar abundance and habitat suitability across
Europe at a 1 km2 cell
2015 (38)
Amount of pig meat traded Comext data from Eurostat which outlines country of origin,
country of destination and amount in tons for many different
product types related to pig meat.
2017 Comext data from Eurostat (40)
Number of pigs Eurostat data on the number of pigs in each NUTS2 region 2017 agr_r_animal data from Eurostat
(40)
Number of pig farms Eurostat data on the number of pig farms in each NUTS2
region
2016 ef_lsk_main data from Eurostat
(40)
Number of Backyard Pigs Eurostat data on the average number of pigs on a backyard
farm
2010 Pig farming sector—statistical
portrait 2014 (40)
Number of Backyard Pig Farms Eurostat data on the number of backyard pig farms in each
EU MS
2010 Pig farming sector—statistical
portrait 2014 (40)
World Map Accurate world map indicating boundaries of countries 2017 Made with Natural Earth
NUTS map Map of NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions in Europe 2018 (45)
Human density A world map of the human population at a 1 km2 cell level 2015 (46)
Pig density A world map of the pig density at a 5 km2 cell level 2014 (47, 48)
Number of households Number of households in each EU MSs 2017 lfst_hhnhtych data from Eurostat
(40)
Population Population size in each EU MSs 2017 demo_pjan data from Eurostat
(40)
All the data is freely available apart from the TRACES dataset, in which access is via competent authorities within the TRACES network.
Overall Risk
We plot the overall probability of at least one
infection in wild boar and pigs for all three pathways
combined (Figure 3).
Predominantly, for both wild boar and pigs, the risk is
focused in Eastern Europe with Latvia, Lithuania and parts
of Poland in particular having many cells of high risk. There
are also high risk areas in the east of Hungary and parts of
Romania. Most countries have some areas of risk for wild boar
transmission while transmission to pigs is much less frequent.
This does not necessarily mean there is no risk for pigs in
those countries, but the risk is too low to see on the scale
forced by the high risk in other countries, combined with the
fine spatial scale meaning it may be difficult to see the cells
with very faint color. Considering the risk per pathway, below,
allows us to investigate this in more detail. However, a detailed
outline of how many cells fall within the different probability
categories for the combined risk and for each pathway is provided
in Supplementary Info S2. We also considered the risk when
aggregated up to a country level, to compare the highest risk
pathway for each country for infection in both wild boar and pigs
(Supplementary Info S2).
Legal Trade of Live Animals
The probability of at least one infection in pigs at a 100 km2 cell
level for EU MSs is plotted in Figure 4. The original data for
trade in live pigs was provided at a post-code level, and since
there are only a few locations with a non-zero probability, in
comparison to the size of Europe, we show these results using
points to represent the post-codes, rather than plotting at the
cell level.
According to the model, many farms across the EU are not
expected to import any pigs at all. Of those that do import, the
probability of importing an infected pig was low on most farms,
based on prevalence data. There were only 310 farms that had a
probability of 1× 10−4 (i.e., one case expected in 10,000 years) or
higher of importing an infected pig. We assume negligible risk in
Figure 4 for any farm with probability <1 × 10−4 of importing
an infected pig. Of those farms that do import, the probability
of subsequent infection of a susceptible pig on most farms was
low or very low; farms which have over a 10% chance of having
at least one infection in a susceptible pig are in Poland, Latvia
or Lithuania. The farm with the highest probability, at 65%, of at
least one infection in a susceptible pig is in Lithuania and the pigs
originated in Estonia.
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FIGURE 3 | The probability of at least one infection with ASFV in (A) wild boar
or (B) pigs in 2019, plotted at a 100 km2 cell level across Europe. Countries in
gray have insufficient data to compute the risk.
As can be seen from Figure 4B, there are a large number
of farms in the Netherlands, Germany, and France which have
a small risk of infection occurring. In comparison (Figure 4C)
fewer farms are at risk of importing infected animals in Poland,
Latvia and Lithuania, but on those farms that do, the probability
that this leads to infection is higher. This is primarily due to
where the animals are imported from. Infected pigs imported
by France, Germany and the Netherlands have primarily come
from Belgium, which has a low estimated prevalence of infection
in pigs for 2019 due to the wild boar cases in 2018. However,
infected pigs entering Poland, Latvia and Lithuania are primarily
coming from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which have higher
prevalence estimates.
When we combine all farms in a country together to
compute a probability of at least one infection per country
(Supplementary Info S2), we find that Poland has the
highest risk with a 99.4% chance that at least one infection
will occur on any farm in Poland from live pig trade.
Lithuania also has a very high probability of 97.6%. There
is then a drop to a 25% probability for Latvia, followed by
Hungary, Germany, and the Netherlands, which has a 5%
chance overall.
Movement of Wild Boar
The probability of at least one infection in wild boar or pigs via
entry through the movement of wild boar is shown in Figure 5.
The risk to boar or pigs is very similar in terms of location,
as all the risk is focused on the areas of reported cases in 2018.
Wild boar movement is relatively local, with dispersal over long
distances unlikely (49), and hence the disease is not expected to
spread far due to boar dispersal (37). In order to see this more
clearly, we zoom in to three regions to gain a better perspective of
the risk to various regions in Europe due to wild boar movement
(Figure 6). The distinct outbreak in Belgium demonstrates most
clearly this risk region around previous cases, with a hotspot
of high risk where the Belgium cases in 2018 were located,
surrounded by an area of higher risk. However, this risk region
is not symmetric as the boar movement is determined by habitat
suitability, and infection of other boar depends on where boar
are in the area—Figure 6A indicates that there is a higher risk to
the south of the original cases toward France than north of the
original cases.
Due to the high prevalence of cases in Poland, Latvia, and
Lithuania in 2018, there is a large risk region throughout these
countries (Figure 6B). As there were so many cases, the risk
regions around each local outbreak are no longer distinct and
hence there is a broader pattern of where infection could occur.
We also highlight the area on the border of Hungary and
Romania (Figure 6C) where there were cases in wild boar in
2018. There weremany cases of ASF in Romania in 2018, but they
were predominantly in pig farms, and hence our estimate for wild
boar prevalence is relatively low, indicating not many cases of
ASF in wild boar in Romania in 2019 due to wild boar movement.
The risk to domestic pigs due to wild boar movement is
lower than the risk to wild boar (Figure 5). This is because the
probability that wild boar will have contact with domestic pigs is
very low as is the likelihood that this contact will lead to viral
transmission—transmission via direct contact is most efficient
via blood contact e.g., due to animals fighting, which is less
likely to occur between boar and pigs compared to within boar
groups. However, some Eastern European countries still end up
with a very high probability of at least one infected domestic pig
through this route; Poland has the highest risk with a predicted
100% chance of infection in pigs, followed by Lithuania (95%),
Romania (80%), Hungary (77%), and Latvia (46%).
Legal Trade of Pig Meat Products
We present the probability of at least one infection in wild
boar and pigs via the legal trade in pig meat products
pathway (Figure 7).
The probability of at least one infection in pigs via the trade
in legal pig meat products is very low overall, with the highest
risk in any cell being 6× 10−4, noticeably lower than the highest
risk via the two other pathways in a single cell. This risk is
also focused mainly on a few countries; Hungary, Romania,
Lithuania, Austria, and Latvia. For Lithuania, Austria and Latvia,
this is primarily due to the amount of meat from infected
pigs entering the country; for Hungary it is a combination of
amount of trade and a high average number of pigs on each
backyard farm; for Romania it is due to the considerably larger
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FIGURE 4 | The probability of at least one infection of ASFV in pigs in 2019 from trade of live pigs at a farm level. In (A) all of Europe is plotted while in (B) the map is
zoomed in to the dotted rectangle in (A) and in (C) the map is zoomed in to the dashed rectangle in (A). All farms indicated by a circle imported at least one infected
animal in at least one simulation and the color indicates the probability that one or more susceptible pigs became infected. Countries in gray have insufficient data to
complete the risk assessment. All farms in the regions with negligible risk either did not import any pigs or did not import any infected pigs. ©EuroGeographics for the
administrative boundaries.
number of backyard farms in the country (more than 10 times
any other country in Europe). At the country level, Hungary
has the highest risk with a probability of 14.5% of at least one
infection in pigs (Supplementary Info S2). The risk of ASF in
boar via this pathway, in comparison, is much higher, and many
countries across the whole of Europe have hotspots of higher risk
(Figure 7B). This is because imported meat is more likely to end
up at a landfill than being swill fed to backyard pigs. Although
Hungary, Lithuania, Austria, Croatia, and Latvia have the most
cells within their country at risk, giving the impression from the
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FIGURE 5 | The probability of at least one infection of ASFV in 2019 in boar
(A) and pigs (B) due to wild boar movement is plotted at a 100 km2 cell level
across Europe. Prevalence in wild boar is estimated from reported cases
in 2018.
map that they may have the highest risk, the country with the
highest risk for boar for this pathway is actually Italy. It has a
probability of 99.7% of at least one infection in boar due to a small
number of high risk cells, including in Sardinia.
Pathway of Highest Risk
For each 100 km2 cell we plot which pathway is the highest risk
for that cell, for both wild boar and pigs (Figure 8), indicating
at a finer scale where resources for different pathways should be
focused. For most cells where wild boar movement can lead to
infection in wild boar or pigs, this will be the pathway of highest
risk. The legal trade of pig products pathway dominates as the
highest risk pathway for infection in wild boar or pigs for many
countries across Europe, with a focus on central Europe (e.g.,
Hungary, Austria, Germany, and Croatia). Dispersed throughout
Europe are cells in which the legal trade of pigs is the highest
pathway, highlighting the fact that this pathway is not widespread
across Europe, due to the small number of farms importing
infected pigs but, when it does occur, it is usually the riskiest
pathway in that cell.
Sensitivity Analysis
We measure the sensitivity of the food pathway to changes in 5
uncertain parameters in Figure 9 by considering changes to the
hotspots of disease risk in the baseline results. For the wild boar,
we find that the duration of waste availability (sensitivity WA)
and boar accessibility to landfills (BA) are the twomost influential
parameters. BA increases the maximum of the probability of
infection in boar, up to 0.2 in some cells, although the median
is still similar to the baseline results. WA leads to a larger number
of cells across Europe considered a hotspot, i.e., probability of
infection > 0.02 (Figure 9A). However, although these new cells
are hotspots, in general the probability of infection in these cells
are in the lower range (i.e., most of these cells have a probability
of infection around 0.05). As such, the median of the overall
distribution of the probability of infection in the hotspot cells is
lower (Figure 9C), although the highest risk cells (i.e., cells with
probability >0.09) still exist. This is clearer to see in the map
across Europe of the probability of infection in boar and pigs for
the sensitivity analysis, provided in Supplementary Info S3.
For infection in pigs, the probability of illegal swill-feeding
(SF) and the proportion of meat that goes to waste (WP) are the
twomost influential parameters as they both increase the number
of cells considered hotspots i.e., probability of infection >0.0001
(Figure 9B) and increase the average and maximum probabilities
of infection in those hotspots (Figure 9D). For both boar and
pigs, the model is not sensitive to the probability that food is
cooked sufficiently to kill the virus (FC).
DISCUSSION
ASF is a porcine disease of significant concern worldwide that is
currently devastating the pig industry with reports that pig meat
production has dropped by 30% in 2019 in China alone (50).
The reduction in trade and subsequent costs are amplified by
the cost of control, such as culling, cleansing, and disinfecting,
implementation of fencing and increased hunting, and the costs
of prevention, such as increased surveillance, dissemination of
disease information and suggested/required preventionmeasures
for farmers and the larger public (10). Therefore, prioritization of
these measures is wise in order to utilize the available resources
as optimally as possible. Risk assessments can be useful tools
to provide a means for determining where the risk of disease
is highest and which pathways are of most concern. They can
indicate where the best places are to perform surveillance to
prevent disease entry, or ensure quick and timely discovery of
disease to allow the possibility of eradication before the disease
infects the pig population at large in a country or becomes
endemic in the wild boar population. In this study, we have
performed a risk assessment for ASF in EU MSs that assesses the
risk for 2019 at a fine spatial scale for three pathways in order
that surveillance can be targeted to disease risk hotspots that are
dependent on the pathway of entry. Overall, we found that the
highest risk of infection in 2019 by ASFV via the three pathways
of legal trade of pigs, movement of wild boar, and legal trade
of pig meat products, is in Eastern European countries where
the cases have so far been concentrated. This is driven by the
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FIGURE 6 | The probability of at least one infection of ASFV in boar in 2019 due to wild boar movement at a 100 km2 cell level. We zoom in to three regions where
there were cases in 2018 (A) Belgium; (B) Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia; and (C) Hungary, Czech Republic, and Romania. Countries are indicated by their ISO3 code.
wild boar movement pathway and the legal trade of live pigs.
For the wild boar movement pathway, this is focused on Eastern
Europe primarily due to the fact that boar movement is relatively
local. For the legal trade of pigs pathway, analysis of the pig
trade input data suggests that many European countries trade
more with their neighbors, so Eastern European countries which
border ASFV infected countries are more likely to trade with
them and hence have a higher risk than countries geographically
further away.
The risk of ASF in boar or pigs differed by spatial location and
in magnitude. The risk of ASF in boar was higher than for pigs
across the two pathways of relevance (trade in pig meat products
and movement of wild boar) and as an overall risk, and was more
broadly spread across the whole of Europe. While EU MSs main
concern regarding ASF may be to protect their pig industry from
incursion of ASF, given the ability of ASFV to transmit from
wild boar to pigs once it enters a country, our results suggest
that EU MSs should also focus on surveillance and prevention
in wild boar populations as the disease is more likely to enter
via this source. This is in line with observed disease incursions
within Europe, as ASFV has been found in most EU countries
in the wild boar population first [e.g., Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic, and Belgium (16)]. For countries without ASF in wild
boar populations already, model results suggest the risk in boars
is driven by the legal trade of pig meat products and hotspots
occur where there is high boar density or high human density.
However, there is high uncertainty associated with these absolute
values due to uncertainty in the underlying data. The underlying
wild boar abundance map (38) made good use of limited data
but is known to have some issues, for example predicting no wild
boar on the border of Finland and Russia and overestimating the
abundance in close proximity to large cities in countries like the
UK which are known to only have a few very specific localized
boar populations. This is due to the need to extrapolate wild boar
abundance across the whole of Europe with data collected only
from some locations.
The results for the legal trade of pigs pathway indicate that 310
farms have a 1/10,000 risk of an infected pig entering the farm
FIGURE 7 | The probability of at least one infection of ASFV in 2019 in (A) wild
boar and (B) pigs, via trade in legal pig meat products, plotted at a 100 km2
cell level across Europe. Countries in gray have insufficient data to complete
the risk assessment.
or higher. If this many farms were actually importing infected
pigs each year, we would expect many more ASF cases on pig
farms via import than has been seen over the past few years. The
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FIGURE 8 | The pathway which has the highest risk of infection of ASFV for
(A) wild boar and (B) pigs is plotted at a 100 km2 cell level across Europe.
Countries in gray have insufficient data to complete the risk assessment.
model may be overestimating this risk as we are not including
an inspection, testing or quarantine step in the pathway, which
would reduce the risk if it does occur. Secondly, rather than
using the raw OIE data for the ASF prevalence in pigs in each
country we use an algorithm designed to account for data gaps
and underreporting (33). This algorithm predicts the prevalence
of ASF in 2019 based on historical cases up to and including
those in 2018, and may overestimate in some situations. These
results indicate that Poland and Lithuania have lower numbers
of farms importing infected pigs, but each farm imports more
infected pigs and therefore have higher chances of infection on
farm, compared to the Netherlands, France, and Germany, which
have many farms importing but each farm has a low probability
of importing an infected pig and it subsequently leading to
transmission (Figure 4). Thus, this could lead to different risk-
based prevention in trade for each area. Poland and Lithuania
would reduce their risk by trading with countries with lower
prevalence of disease, while Germany, the Netherlands, and
France would reduce their risk by having fewer farms importing
fewer pigs.
Results indicate that the spread of ASF via movement of wild
boar is limited to short distances (37), although ASF is able to
cross borders easily due to the lack of detection of infected wild
animals. The risk via this pathway is much patchier, with many
countries not affected at all in their pig or boar populations.
The risk to wild boar is much higher than for pigs, due to the
lack of contact between boar and pig populations. However,
transmission to pigs can occur which can be reduced by ensuring
good biosecurity practices are in place on pig farms to prevent
the contact between wild boar and domestic pigs (2, 22). One
aspect of this pathway which has not been included is any control
measures thatmay have been implemented around reported cases
of ASF in wild boar. For example, in Figure 6A, the risk of ASF
in boar in France due to wild boar movement from the Belgian
2018 cases is relatively high. However, we did not include the
fact that Belgium erected a fence around their reported cases to
stop wild boar movement and implemented increased hunting
in the area (16). Therefore, in reality, the risk to France would
be much lower, depending on the width and permeability of
the fence (37).
The legal trade of pig meat products pathway indicates
highest risk for pigs in Eastern European countries which
have high numbers of both backyard pig farms and average
number of pigs on a backyard farm (40). However, these
countries still have a low overall risk in comparison to other
pathways. The low risk for this pathway is due to low
probability of swill-feeding, as it is illegal, and the low chances
that meat from infected pigs will enter a household with a
backyard farm.
As there are so many component parts in the legal trade of
pig meat products pathway, this pathway is subject to the most
uncertainty. This uncertainty can be delineated into three major
sources—using data from outside the EU, making assumptions
regarding the spatial distribution of data, and simplifying the
complicated food and waste industries. Firstly, the use of data
from outside the EU. It was not possible to always find relevant
data for EU countries and so it was necessary to use data
that had been gathered from other countries as a proxy. In
particular, we used an estimate for Australia for the probability
that swill feeding would occur (51). Given that swill feeding
in Australia is illegal, as it is in the EU, we felt this to be a
reasonable approximation. Regarding the proportion of products
consumed in a restaurant, the proportion of waste lost in the
distribution chain and the proportion of waste that goes to
landfills, we used a study from the USA as again we could find
no data for EU countries (52). We also used a different US study
regarding the probability that food is cooked to 60◦C to kill
the virus (53). It is possible that there are significant differences
between the USA and EU countries regarding cooking and
waste practices. We made a number of assumptions regarding
the spatial distribution of data within the EU. This included
assuming an (almost) homogeneous distribution of backyard
pigs in all EU MSs, based on analysis of the spatial distribution
in Great Britain (see Supplementary Info S1). In reality, this
may not be the case for some countries in Europe, for example
Romania, have a huge backyard pig sector with most households
having a backyard pig farm or being part of a community
farm, whereas in Great Britain there are relatively few backyard
farms. Therefore, it is possible that an increase in number
of farms would change the spatial distribution. Similarly, we
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FIGURE 9 | The effect of uncertain parameters in the legal trade of pig meat products pathway on hotspots of disease risk across Europe. In (A,B) the number of 100
km2 cells which are hotspots for wild boar infection and domestic pig infection are plotted, respectively, for the baseline and sensitivity parameters. In (C,D) the
distribution of the probability of infection across 100 km2 cells which are hotspots in Europe for wild boar and pig infection, respectively, for the baseline and sensitivity
parameters. The baseline results, as shown in Figure 7, are denoted by Base. The sensitivity parameters are: WA, duration of waste availability for boar; WP,
proportion of food that goes to waste; SF, the probability of illegal swill-feeding; BA, the probability that boar are able to access waste; and FC, the proportion of food
that is cooked sufficiently to kill the virus.
assumed that the waste is kept in the same cell as it was
produced. On the one hand, wild boar can access waste from
intermediate waste sites (such as household or park rubbish
bins) and so this assumption is suitable. However, potentially
the waste is then conveyed to a small number of large collecting
points. However, as we did not have data on the location of
landfill sites, it was determined better to assume it stayed in
the same cell. There was also a need to assume that all EU
MSs acted in the same way, when in reality there could be
many heterogeneities at a country level and even a finer scale.
For example, the waste procedures may be different across each
country, or even within each country, and the accessibility of
landfills or other waste sites by boar may differ across Europe.
Similarly the probability of swill-feeding is likely to be different
across countries within the EU but due to a lack of data we
assumed the same probability for all EU countries. Lastly, in
order to parametrize this pathway given little data, we made
simplifications regarding the food and waste industries. For
example, we assumed that raw food would undergo a cooking
process only in the destination country, when it is possible
that salting, drying, or smoking processes were subsequently
undergone after entry to the destination country. If meat
underwent different processes after entry, this would likely
change the viral load in the products upon consumption. There
is also a lack of data regarding the effect of processes, such as
salting, on the viral load in products, other than the decay due to
the length of time for the process. Similarly, we did not separately
consider the role of commercial bodies, such as food producers,
when distributing the meat in each country. We assumed that
the “restaurant” setting would cover all waste of meat that is
not from a household setting. Although this restaurant option
would be closer to food production than households in terms
of amount of food wasted and the proportion of wasted food
that goes to landfill, there may still be differences. For example,
food producers may be more likely than restaurants to send their
waste food to the biofuel industry or to other alternative places to
landfills (52).
Given the numerous uncertainties with the legal trade of pig
meat products pathway, we performed a sensitivity analysis on
themost uncertain parameters within this pathway. This revealed
that the model was most sensitive for estimation of infection in
wild boar to parameters related to the waste procedures—the
availability and accessibility of refuse waste to boar. Publication
of waste procedures across multiple countries may reduce this
uncertainty. For estimation of infection in pigs, the probability of
illegal swill-feeding and proportion of pig meat products going to
waste were themost sensitive parameters. It is very hard to reduce
the uncertainty in the former parameter, due to its illegal nature,
but data could be collated on the amount of food wastage across
different food industry sectors to reduce the uncertainty in the
latter parameter.
There are also uncertainty issues raised with the other
pathways, for example, the map of wild boar abundance is
based heavily on hunting bag records which are difficult
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to produce abundance estimates from accurately (54). Other
uncertainties exist regarding boar ecology and movement
dispersal. Data on wild animals and on abundance of
species is difficult to collect and to ensure its accuracy, and
therefore uncertainties will always remain when modeling
a disease involving a wild species. Risk assessment is a
prediction process and therefore, when asking what potentially
could happen, there will always be both model and data
uncertainty, lack of data or up-to-date data, and inaccurate
data for wild and livestock species. For a model with such
a broad scope, it is expected that there will be reasonable
concerns about the specific absolute values. However, we
believe we have found the best data possible for this risk
assessment of ASF in Europe in 2019 and that our relative
results regarding general trends, spatial hotspots, pathways
of greatest risk, and comparisons between boar and pigs
are robust.
Our risk assessment considered what we thought to be the
most important routes for entry or spread of ASF in EU MSs.
However, there are other potential routes that could lead to
infection with ASF in boar or pigs, such as intra-country trade
of pigs, illegal trade of pigs, or pig meat, non-commercial
movement of pig meat (for example, travelers legally bringing
meat across borders in Europe), and the transport of fomites (2,
9). Whilst our spatial framework is applicable to these pathways,
they are difficult to parametrize in a quantitative setting across
Europe due to lack of within-country data, free movement across
Europe (leading to a lack of data regarding movement between
countries), the extensive road and rail network, and the illegal
nature of some of the activities. Simons et al. (33) considered
an illegal pig products pathway, as well as the three considered
here, for the entry of ASFV into EU MSs and found that
the amount of meat from infected pigs entering each EU MSs
was usually lower via illegal routes than legal routes, although
there was more uncertainty associated with the illegal route. A
few models have considered some of these routes in a semi-
quantitative or qualitative manner indicating that these pathways
could potentially be of greater risk than the three considered
here. In a recent study that considers the risk of infection with
ASFV in the Netherlands and Finland using multiple models
(55), a semi-quantitative Finnish model (NORA) found that
human transportation was the pathway of the greatest risk for
Finland, and the qualitative Swedish model (SVARRA) found
that the indirect pathway (including transport, human travel,
feed, and bedding) was equal or higher risk than the three
pathways in this risk assessment. Less recently, Mur et al. (31)
considered the risk of introduction to European countries for
multiple pathways using a semi-quantitative approach and found
that the illegal trade and transport/fomites pathways were the
riskiest for some countries (for illegal trade: France, Germany,
Italy, and the UK; for transport: Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania,
and Poland). However, this is based on a very different disease
situation, as there were far fewer cases in wild boar in 2013
and hence the risk via the wild boar movement is expected to
have increased since then given the current disease situation,
and may therefore change the riskiest pathway per country
if recalculated today. All risk assessments struggle to estimate
the risk by pathways which are very stochastic in nature,
usually due to human behavior. These behavioral aspects, such
as whether farmers will implement good biosecurity, whether
travelers will listen to warnings about not transporting meat
products, or whether a driver will use a certain rest stop to eat
their ham sandwich, are rare and unpredictable, making a risk
assessment, especially on a fine spatial scale, unreliable. Perhaps
connections with social science are required to understand
these behavioral decisions and hence disease pathways more
fully. However, it is generally considered that human-mediated
transmission, for example, by non-commercial movement of
meat products or fomites on transport, is one of the most
important pathways for ASFV transmission (2). Therefore, risk
assessments need to find a way to assess these pathways as
accurately as possible.
Within this risk assessment we have taken a high-level
approach, for example by modeling wild boar dispersal as a
single event rather than considering the intricate population
dynamics of wild boar. When considering exact management or
control strategies to implement, a bespoke model including these
intricate details may be required. Our high-level approach was
taken in order to keep the risk assessment generic. Therefore,
the movement of wild boar pathway can also be used for
other wild animals that may transmit a different pathogen via
either dispersal or home range movements, by only changing
a few parameters. Similarly, the trade of live pigs and pig
meat can be adapted for other species and diseases and,
therefore, multiple diseases can be assessed using this overall
framework. This can speed up risk assessment, especially for
emerging diseases with little information to model intricately,
and is useful for directing risk prioritization of diseases,
pathways or locations. Furthermore, our risk assessment is
easily updated with new data and able to be re-run quickly,
allowing for changes in the risk profile across Europe to
be monitored.
Our risk assessment for ASF indicates hotspots of high
risk for disease incursion and infection, such as the border
betweenHungary and Romania for both the wild boar movement
and legal trade of pig meat products pathways, or the area
surrounding Belgium for the legal trade of pigs and pig meat.
It also indicates which pathways should be the focus in different
areas. These results can aid decision makers and risk managers
to determine what type and intensity of surveillance, prevention
and control measures are necessary for different regions for
ASF. This risk assessment will assist EU MSs in their efforts for
the prevention and detection of ASF, and our risk assessment
framework is applicable for other locations, such as China,
Vietnam and Cambodia, provided the equivalent data are
available. As ASF continues to spread throughout Europe and
across Asia, risk assessments such as this can determine how to
best tackle the disease.
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